On July 18, 2006, San Francisco substantially expanded efforts towards achieving universal health care coverage in the city by passing the Health Care Security Ordinance (HCSO) into law. Part of this reform was a pay-or-play type of minimum employer health spending requirement which became effective on January 9, 2008 and now covers all private sector employers hiring 20 or more workers. Additionally, the city created a low-cost health access plan called "Healthy San Francisco" which both strengthened the safety net and provided a "public option" for employers to fulfill their health spending requirement. Although this public option is not formally considered insurance, it is tantamount to a generous public insurance policy, with the significant caveat that it is restricted to a network of providers located only within San Francisco (Katz 2008; Katz and Brigham 2011) .
Operated by the San Francisco Department of Public Health, Healthy San Francisco was launched in July of 2007 and offers affordable access to select public and private facilities within the city of San Francisco for uninsured San Francisco residents. Employers can meet their spending requirement through providing insurance to workers, paying into Health Savings Accounts or Health Reimbursement Accounts, or by paying into the public Healthy San Francisco program. In this sense, the policy is similar to "pay or play" mandates that have been widely discussed in the context of national and state level health reform debates. In 2008, the employer spending requirement in San Francisco amounted to about $3,633 annually for a full-time employee in a large firm. This is a relatively stringent requirement; the 2008 Kaiser/HRET Employer Health Benefit Survey found average premiums of $4,704 for single coverage.
Employer health insurance mandates have garnered increasing attention as Massachusetts implemented state-level health reform, followed by the recently enacted federal health insurance reform which also included a variant of a pay-orplay mandate. There are many unresolved questions as to how employer mandates perform in practice. To date, however, there has been little evidence to inform debates about their potential effects, particularly at the employer level. When given different options, how do employers choose to comply with the mandate? If one of these options is paying into a public program, how many and what type of employers opt to "pay" into a public plan, as opposed to "play"-i.e., meet the spending requirement through providing employees with insurance or health accounts? How supportive are employers of such mandates? Using the unique policy innovation implemented in San Francisco, we provide initial evidence on these questions.
Hawaii and Massachusetts are the only two states so far yielding evidence on employer mandates; the San Francisco mandate analyzed in the present paper is the first to be enacted at a municipal level. Since 1974, Hawaii has required all employers to provide health care benefits to any employee who works 20 hours a week or more (there is no "pay" option). Massachusetts' reform, like reform in San Francisco, was also associated with an eligibility expansion for public health coverage. Massachusetts differs from the Hawaii and San Francisco case, however, in that it was implemented along with an individual mandate to carry insurance, and also because the Massachusetts employer requirement is fairly minimal (a $295 annual "fair share" contribution for each employee) (www.mass.gov).
In 2014, the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act will assess a fee on all U.S. employers with more than 50 employees that do not offer coverage but that have at least one full-time employee who receives a premium tax credit. That fee will be $2,000 per full-time employee (but excluding the first 30 employees from the assessment). Employers with more than 50 employees that offer coverage, but who have at least one full-time employee receiving a premium tax credit, will pay the lesser of $3,000 for each employee receiving a premium credit or $2,000 for each full-time employee. This is a form of a pay-or-play mandate similar to the one in San Francisco, and is about the same magnitude as the San Francisco mandate for medium size firms.
Certain characteristics of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act make it more difficult for employers to comply with than the San Francisco ordinance, such as the fact that health reimbursement accounts will not be an allowable option for meeting the federal requirement. But other provisions make the federal law less costly for employers-e.g., a smaller proportion of employers will be subject to the federal mandate, part-time workers are exempted, and the fee assessed on non-offering employers is lower. Although generalization from a single city (especially a high income city with a strong safety net) such as San Francisco must be done with care, experience from San Francisco's mandate may provide a useful benchmark compared to other less stringent mandates.
Several recent studies have examined employer responses to the Massachusetts mandate. Based on a pre-post comparison from a Massachusetts household survey, Long and Masi found no evidence of dropped coverage or restricted eligibility, and no major changes in the scope of benefits, network of providers, cost to employees or quality of available care under health plans (2008) . They also found that employer sponsored coverage had expanded due to increased take up among employees.
Gabel and colleagues surveyed Massachusetts employers, finding that the percentage of firms with 3 or more employees offering health benefits increased from 73 to 79 percent, that there was an increase in firms offering Section 125 plans, and that Massachusetts employers were less likely than other US firms to terminate coverage or restrict eligibility Gabel, Whitmore, Pickreign 2007) . Furthermore, evidence from Massachusetts indicates that despite concerns about potential crowd out from new public options (Cutler and Gruber 1996; Gruber and Simon 2008) , there was actually an expansion in private coverage. However, in the Massachusetts case it can be difficult to sort out the effects of the employer mandate separately from that of the individual insurance mandate. In contrast, San Francisco does not have such an individual mandate, but imposes a strong employer mandate, allowing clearer interpretation of the effects of a pay-or-play requirement.
Researchers have also studied how the Hawaii employer mandate has affected coverage levels using the United States or individual states as a comparison group. The Hawaiian plan is an employer mandate without a "pay" option, which is useful for isolating insurance coverage effects, but cannot help in predicting the crowd-out or selection behaviors when a public option is available. Research on the Hawaii mandate has shown that the mandate reduced uninsurance, though the amount of the reduction is disputed (Buchmueller, DiNardo, Valletta 2009; Dick 1994; Lee et al. 2005; Lewin and Sybinsky 1993; Neubauer 1993; Thurston 1997) . However, there is some evidence that employers avoid the mandate by hiring part time workers, indicating labor market distortions. In San Francisco such substitution toward part-time workers would be unlikely, given that in 2008 the mandate applied to all employees working 10 hours or more per week (as well as temp and contract workers).
The San Francisco reforms offer a unique opportunity to advance our understanding of the effects of these types of reforms. One key feature is that surrounding Bay Area counties offer natural comparison groups that allow for a stronger research design than have been possible for Hawaii and Massachusetts. Second, the nature of the policy allows us to answer some questions that were not possible to answer using either or both of the other policy interventions. For example, the use of a public plan in the "pay" option in San Francisco allows us to evaluate how employers choose these options, something that the Hawaiian experience cannot speak to. Moreover, given the minimal nature of the fee paid by non-offering employers in Massachusetts, inferences from that state may be difficult to generalize to more stringent pay-or-play mandates such as those scheduled to take effect in 2014 under new federal reform. There is also little evidence on how employers change their health plans in response to a mandate, how employers choose to comply with a mandate, or the role of Health Reimbursement Accounts (HRAs) and Health Savings Accounts (HSAs). Finally, it is always possible that the nature of the effects may relate to the unique characteristics of Hawaii and Massachusetts. Although the same is true when focusing on a particular city like San Francisco, evidence from multiple cases helps paint a more representative picture about the effects of employer mandates.
The San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance
The HCSO took effect on January 9, 2008 for for-profit employers with 50 or more employees, and on April 1, 2008 for for-profit employers with 20-49 employees and non-profit employers with 50 or more employees. After the Ordinance was adopted by the city of San Francisco in 2006, the HCSO was challenged under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by the Golden Gate Restaurant Association, leading to a minor eight day postponement of implementation as well as further court challenges that were not resolved until June 2010 when the Supreme Court rejected a request to review the Ordinance. The employer spending requirement varies by employer size and profit status. In 2008, the Ordinance required employers in San Francisco with 20-99 workers nationwide to meet a minimum spending requirement of $1.17 per hour for health care services for each of their employees. Employers with 100 or more workers nationwide were required to spend $1.76 per hour per worker. On January 1, 2009, this rate was increased to $1.23 per hour for employers with 20-99 employees and $1.85 for firms with 100 or more employees and in 2010 the rates were increased to $1.31 and $1.96, respectively. For-profit employers with fewer than 20 employees and non-profit employers with fewer than 50 employees are exempt from the spending requirement (about 25% of San Francisco workers at for-profit firms are employed at exempt firms).
1 There are no requirements to 1 Author calculations from Dun and Bradstreet database, provided by Survey Sampling, Inc.
specifically provide health benefits to family members. A key feature of the HCSO compared to some other employer mandates is that the employer must spend this minimum amount not as an average percent of payroll, but rather for each and every non-exempt employee. This feature implies that the San Francisco employer mandate is substantially more stringent than the key pay-orplay provision in the 2010 federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Employers may spend the funds on a third-party health provider (including medical, dental and vision insurance), reimburse employees directly for their health expenses, create health savings or health reimbursement accounts, or pay the funds to the City for their employees' access to health care through participation in Healthy San Francisco. Some limited classes of workers are exempt from the mandate: managerial, supervisory, and confidential employees who earn over $72,450 per year, employees who are eligible for Medicare and/or CHAMPUS/TRICARE, and employees working less than 10 hours per week. Finally, workers who verify that they receive dependent coverage from another employer may opt out voluntarily.
Healthy San Francisco
Healthy San Francisco is administered by the Department of Public Health and has a limited provider network. Healthy San Francisco encourages access to primary and preventive care by providing a Medical Home and primary physician to each program participant, as well as specialty care, urgent and emergency care, laboratory, inpatient hospitalization, radiology, and pharmaceuticals. Quarterly program participation fees range from $0 to $450 on a sliding scale and are community rated. Employees at firms who choose to contribute to the City option, Healthy San Francisco, receive a 75% discount on these program participation fees if they qualify for Healthy San Francisco. San Francisco residents with an income at or below 500% of the Federal Poverty Level (for one person $54,150; for a family of four $110,250) are eligible to enroll in Healthy San Francisco as long as they have been uninsured for 90 days, are between 18 and 64, and are not eligible for other public programs. Healthy San Francisco is free if an enrollee is below 300% of the federal poverty line and their employer contributes to the program. Employees must themselves enroll in Healthy San Francisco after the employer makes a contribution on their behalf, but they can enroll at any time and often only enroll when they seek care (Healthy San Francisco 2010).
Conceptual Framework
Under the San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance, firms must decide whether to offer private health benefits or pay into the public plan. If they offer private benefits, employers must decide how much to contribute, and which types of benefits to offer. In a competitive labor market with profit maximizing firms, in the long run wages are expected to compensate for monetary and nonmonetary advantages or disadvantages among jobs, including health benefits (Rosen 1986 ). In such a market with a fixed labor supply, the imposition of an employer mandate to provide health benefits (or any other fringe benefits) is predicted to increase total compensation costs, and therefore shift the labor demand curve downward and cause wages and employment to fall. However, if employees value the additional benefit at its cost, labor supply will shift outward and employment will not fall (though wages will fall by the value employees place on the benefit). In equilibrium, if the value employees place on health insurance is equivalent to the employers' costs of providing insurance, wages will be reduced by the full cost of the benefit and employment will be unchanged. However, if employees are near minimum wage or firms have other institutional constraints such as union rules or norms, then it may not be possible for wages to adjust at least in the short run, thus some employers may have added reason to prefer the minimum allowable benefit packages (Baicker and Chandra 2006) . Overall we would expect employers to shift the cost of the mandate to employees in the form of lowered wages.
As wage and benefit packages change in some firms in response to the mandate, it is possible that in the longer run employees would sort themselves into different firms than their current ones. A profit-maximizing firm is expected to offer a compensation package that is designed to attract the number and kinds of workers it wishes to hire, based on their marginal productivity. Employees compare compensation packages offered by employers, so each compensation package is likely to be influenced by market conditions and the practices of other employers in the market. In the long-run, workers will tend to sort among firms on the basis of their preferences for health benefits (Monheit and Vistnes 1999) . It follows that an employer's benefit decisions are based largely around local labor market conditions, the cost of the benefits (net of public subsidies), and the value that employees place on different types of benefits and wages (Bundorf 2002; Dranove, Spier, Baker 2000) . The cost and value of the benefit package is influenced by firm and employee characteristics, such as employer size or the health profile of employees. Next we discuss how this may influence the changing decisions of firms to offer insurance.
Pay-or-Play Decision
When there is no mandate to provide coverage, an employer is expected to offer a private benefit package if the sum of the value that employees in the firm place on this benefit package is greater than the cost to the employer offering the benefit. Under a pay-or-play mandate with a per-hour spending requirement, the choice becomes whether to offer private coverage or pay into the public option, Healthy San Francisco. The employer will pay into Healthy San Francisco if the total compensation costs (necessary to attract the optimal labor supply) are lower when paying the minimum benefit to the City than when offering private benefits. Thus theory predicts that firms hiring workers with weak preferences for private health insurance, and firms whose costs of providing coverage are higher, will be less likely to offer private health benefits. Among firms who do choose to offer private coverage, the high spending requirement implies that insurance policies may be more generous than in the absence of the mandate, with less employee costsharing (thus lower employee-paid premiums, deductibles, etc.). It is also important to note that in the San Francisco case, the health spending requirement is based on the number of hours each employee works, rather than a fixed cost. Because private health benefits usually have some fixed costs, in many cases it may be cost-minimizing for firms to pay into Healthy San Francisco. Historically, the firms least likely to offer coverage or other benefits are those with fewer employees, lower-wage workforces, greater turnover, no unions, and a large proportion of part-time employees (Gabel et al. 2003) . Employers are more likely to offer private benefits and to make greater contributions in communities with tighter labor markets, less concentrated labor purchasers, greater union penetration, and a greater share of workers in large firms and a small share in regulated industries (Marquis and Long 2001) .
Crowd Out
Under an employer mandate with a public option, some firms may choose to drop their private coverage policies if they feel that the public option and private coverage are substitutes to employees and the public option is less expensive (Cutler and Gruber 1996) . In this case, Healthy San Francisco and private health insurance are not likely to be perceived as substitutes in the first year of implementation: Healthy San Francisco has a limited provider network, there may be stigma associated with public programs, enrollment may be perceived as difficult, and Healthy San Francisco may be perceived as temporary. In addition, enrollees must be uninsured for 90 days to be eligible for Healthy San Francisco. All of these factors may reduce the value of the public option to employees. In addition, employees must themselves enroll in Healthy San Francisco after the employer makes a contribution on their behalf. If the employee does not enroll or does not attribute the reduced participation fees to the employer, they will not perceive any value from the benefit, and employers will be less able to pass on any of the costs to wages. Evidence thus far indicates that among employees whose employers are paying into the program on their behalf, 32%
were not yet receiving Healthy San Francisco benefits as of 2010 (Healthy San Francisco 2010) .
If employees are part-time, or if they qualify for means-tested Healthy San Francisco premium subsidies, this public option may be more attractive. Healthy San Francisco quarterly enrollment fees are based on a sliding scale, with greater city and state subsidies for low-income workers, making the program significantly less expensive than traditional health insurance. City and state subsidies account for approximately 70% of Healthy San Francisco funds (though most of these subsidies go to individually enrolled participants rather than those enrolled through employers), while the remainder is covered by employer and participant payments (Brigham 2009 ). Also, after employers pay into Healthy San Francisco, these employees are eligible to receive benefits at a 75% discount on premiums. Part-time workers pay the same premium rates as full time workers. Healthy San Francisco premiums are also community rated, so firms with higher risk profiles may find significant cost savings in Healthy San Francisco compared to the private market. Workers in these categories may place higher value on Healthy San Francisco benefits, and firms with more part-time, low-wage, or high risk employees may be more likely to choose the public option. However, due to the considerations above, along with the rule that residents must be uninsured for 90 days to be eligible for Healthy San Francisco, we do not expect many workers who have the option of private insurance to drop it in favor of Healthy San Francisco.
Health Reimbursement Accounts
In addition to traditional private insurance and Healthy San Francisco, employers have the option of putting the required funds in a Health Reimbursement Account (HRA) for the employee. HRAs are attractive to employers because the employer owns the account and can take back unused funds at the end of the year or upon termination of employment. It is currently unclear whether firms may meet the minimum spending requirement based on the amount of gross contributions to an HRA, even if they take back unused funds such that the net amount paid is below the minimum spending requirement. Anecdotally, benefits consultants in San Francisco have suggested to businesses that HRAs may be the lowest cost strategy for meeting the requirement, thus it is of interest to measure how commonly this strategy is adopted.
Market Distortions and Regulatory Constraints
Employer behavior is further complicated by a wide array of insurance market distortions and additional regulations; although overall there is robust health insurer competition in the Bay Area. In response to adverse selection and consumer protection concerns, insurance markets are subject to a variety of state and federal regulations, such as 10% health-related premium rate bands in the California small group market, and tax exemptions for employer-sponsored insurance premiums (lowering the cost of private insurance to workers). Additionally, the presence of a city-wide minimum wage law in San Francisco implies that wages may not be able to easily adjust to compensate for the employer health spending requirement. In 2008, the minimum wage was $9.36, significantly higher than the federal rate of $6.55 and the state rate of $8.00. In 2009-2010, the minimum wage in San Francisco is $9.79 an hour, while the federal rate is $7.25 and the state rate is still $8.00. Furthermore, it is technically illegal for employers to explicitly lower wages due to the Health Care Security Ordinance (San Francisco Office of Labor Standards Enforcement 2010). In addition, all employers in San Francisco must provide paid sick leave to each employee. If workers do not have productivity equal to the minimum wage in addition to the cost of the fringe benefits including health insurance and paid sick leave benefits, these workers risk becoming unemployed or having their hours reduced (Bundorf 2002) . The employer spending requirement in San Francisco amounts to about $2,415 annually for a full-time employee in a medium size firm (20-99 employees) and $3,633 annually for a full-time employee in a large firm (≥100 employees). This represents a substantial increase in compensation: 12% for a minimum wage worker in a medium size firm and 18% for a minimum wage worker in a large firm.
Finally, some of the products produced by affected firms are not fully tradable -in that they are not perfect substitutes with products made in surrounding areas or elsewhere. This allows prices in San Francisco to respond to the mandate, especially at highly impacted firms in the service sector. Given transportation costs, driving outside of the city to buy a restaurant meal or to go to the grocery store is not a sensible decision for many consumers facing a moderate increase in meal price. This is particularly true due to the geography of the San Francisco Bay Area, with San Francisco being connected to two of the three contiguous counties by toll-bridges. This segmentation allows prices of some sectors in San Francisco to rise in response to the mandate. This geographic factor makes lessons from San Francisco more relevant for understanding impacts of a national level policy change, where (within country) geographic substitution possibilities are similarly small.
Study Data and Methods
The primary data source for this analysis is the 2008 Bay Area Employer Health Benefits Survey, conducted in 2008 by the University of California, Berkeley. National Research, LLC was contracted to complete the interviews. before the employer spending requirement went into effect, in addition to 2008 changes in benefits, in order to measure both baseline offerings and postimplementation changes. This characteristic of the survey may introduce recall bias, as the survey asks employers to recollect details of health benefit plans from the prior year. However, since health benefit plans are updated infrequently (usually annually), the magnitude of such bias is likely to be limited. Our main sampling frame consisted of all 2,886 for-profit San Francisco firms with more than 20 employees according to a Dun and Bradstreet database of firms, of which we interviewed 526. A portion of these firms responded in the survey that they had less than 20 employees nationwide (N=112), so we dropped them from these analyses because they were not subject to the Health Care Security Ordinance. During the same period, we also surveyed a random sample of 310 for-profit firms with more than 20 employees from areas surrounding San Francisco to serve as a control group. Using the Council of American Research Organization (CASRO) method, the response rate was 19% (19% in San Francisco firms and 20% in control firms). The industry, firm size and geographic distribution of firms that responded to the 2008 Bay Area Employer Health Benefits Survey were similar to those that refused participation according to data available from the Dun and Bradstreet Database (Appendix 1). Furthermore, an additional 639 firms in San Francisco and 371 firms in comparison counties refused to participate in the survey but answered one question: "Does your firm currently offer health benefits to at least some of your employees?" The percent offering health insurance was 93% in our completed sample as compared to 91% in the sample refusing to participate; thus while the low response rate is concerning, evidence suggests that systematic non-response differences in health insurance offering were small. Using our weighting scheme and limiting the sample to firms with more than 20 employees in the Bay Area, our insurance offer rate is consistent with the 95% offer rate in the California Health Care Foundation's 2007 California Employer Health Benefits Survey, further corroborating the representativeness of our sample (California Health Care Foundation 2007). All results reported below are weighted to reflect the population distribution of firm characteristics in the surveyed counties. Our analysis begins by categorizing the degree to which firms were already in compliance with the health spending requirements at the 2007 pre-HCSO baseline, or conversely how large of a change they would have to make to their health benefit spending to comply with HCSO. First, we consider the percent of employees eligible for health coverage, and the percent of employees taking up coverage in the baseline. To then calculate how many employees would need to be offered coverage and be paid for, we calculate the proportion of workers required to be covered under the mandate by estimating the proportion of workers exempted due to being part-time or new employees. 4 An "eligibility gap" is then created by subtracting from this the percentage of workers covered by insurance prior to the employer mandate. By then adding to the eligibility gap the proportion of workers who were eligible in 2007 but opted to not take up coverage, we calculate the "coverage gap." This gap represents the additional percentage of workers who will need to be covered under the mandate unless they sign a waiver. A third type of compliance measure that we report is the "contribution gap," which is based on the difference between post-HCSO mandated spending levels and pre-HCSO reported employer total health benefit spending in 2007. The baseline per-worker-hour spending contribution is calculated for each health plan the firm offers by dividing the single enrollee monthly employer premium by 172 work hours. For each plan the firm offers, this figure is then subtracted from either $1.76 for firms with more than 100 employees nationwide or $1.17 for firms with 20-99 employees nationwide. For firms with multiple plans we create a weighted average of these payment differences based on the enrollment in each health plan and the number of workers who were uncovered in 2007. This contribution gap measures the per worker hour increase in health spending that the firm will be required to make to comply with the employer mandate (assuming that spending does not decrease for any employees currently exceeding the minimum). Because we need to make various exemption assumptions to calculate these compliance measures, we also report ranges of compliance corresponding to upper and lower bound assumptions.
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A different set of analyses examines various strategies that San Francisco firms have reported adopting by 2008 or are highly likely to adopt for 2009. These include the proportion contributing to the Healthy San Francisco public option, the proportion expanding private coverage in various dimensions, and the proportion contracting private coverage. Contraction could be due to either crowd out, or the need to reduce generosity for some employees in order to finance increased spending for other employees. We report each of these weighted means for the overall San Francisco sample of firms covered by the employer mandate, as well as for a subgroup of firms who we estimate should be least impacted (have a small eligibility gap so little increased spending is needed) and most impacted (have a large eligibility gap, requiring larger spending increases). Our initial hypothesis is that highly impacted firms would respond more to the HCSO, but it is possible that less impacted firms (that have already revealed strong preferences for employer health spending) could also exhibit substantial changes. We also report means for the subgroup of firms with at least some low-wage workers (paid ≤$10/hour). We summarize the characteristics of each of these sample groups in Table 1 .
To investigate the extent to which health benefit changes were likely caused by HCSO rather than reflecting other local trends, we next report regression-adjusted comparisons of health benefit changes in San Francisco firms compared to similar firms in surrounding Bay Area counties not subject to the HCSO mandate using a difference-in-difference framework. The local differencein-difference method controls for common trends in the local area (i.e., San Francisco and adjacent counties) and trends that vary by observable firm characteristics. It is possible that firms in San Francisco may have experienced other non-mandate related shocks that might differ from the surrounding counties 5 First, we do not know the number of workers hired in the last 90 calendar days; we only know the number of workers hired in the past year. We assume a uniform distribution of hiring over the year and use a quarter of those hired in the past year as an estimate for this group. Second, we do not know the joint distribution of tenure and hours. We assume that those who were exempt due to part-time work were not also newly employed. If the same workers who were recently hired work less than 10 hours per week, we would overestimate the number of exempt workers in the firm. Finally, we do not know the effect of waivers on exemption. Workers with another form of health care coverage can sign a waiver to exempt them from the health care spending requirement. If those who currently do not take up insurance sign waivers, we would be underestimating the number of exempt workers in the firm. To generate comparable survey responses for firms within and outside of San Francisco, the survey questions analyzed in this section did not refer to the HCSO, but rather asked simply whether firms had adopted the relevant change between 2007 and 2008. Questions analyzed include both coverage expansions and coverage contractions. For each question we report the San Francisco proportion of firms adopting the change, and then the regression-adjusted difference between San Francisco and comparison counties as an estimate of the degree of change that San Francisco firms would have adopted even in the absence of the HCSO. The difference between the San Francisco and comparison firms is our best estimate of the degree to which HCSO causally induced health benefit changes by 2008. We report regression results both for the full sample of firms size 20 and over, and also for the subsets of highly impacted firms and lowwage firms. Regressions controlled for firm size (number of employees), whether the firm is part of a chain, and indicators for one-digit SIC industry type. We used ordinary least squares models for continuous outcome variables and probit models with reported marginal effects for binary outcome variables with exceptions for small samples. We used linear regression in the "plan to start offering insurance" regression due to the small number of non-offering firms and in the low-wage group regressions because of problems of perfect prediction. We report Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for all regressions.
Results

Baseline Insurance Benefit Offering in San Francisco
Most targeted firms already offered health benefits to some employees, but not to all employees covered by HCSO. In San Francisco, 92 percent of firms with 20 or more employees already offered health insurance to some employees in 2007 before the employer mandate was implemented (Figure 1 ). This finding differed somewhat by firm size: firms with 20-99 employees had an 89 percent offer rate compared to 95 percent for firms with 100+ employees. These statistics are similar to national averages: 91% of U.S. firms with 20 or more employees offer health benefits, and the rate rises to 93% if we limit the sample to this size group in urban areas (Kaiser/HRET 2008). Among firms in San Francisco, restaurants were significantly less likely to offer health benefits at baseline, as were smaller firms with 20-50 employees. Firms with unionized workers were significantly more likely to offer health benefits.
Figure 1: 2007 Health Benefit Statistics
After adjusting for firm characteristics, the offer rate for San Francisco firms with 20 or more workers was statistically similar to that of comparison firms outside of San Francisco (94 percent overall), but greater than the offer rate in small San Francisco firms not subject to the mandate (80 percent). Like similar surveys, we found that the offer rate was slightly higher in our sample of completed interviews than among firms who refused to participate in the survey but answered just a single question about whether they offer insurance (Claxton et al. 2008 ). But the difference was very small: in the larger sample including these non-responders, insurance was offered by 93 percent of firms size 20 and over in San Francisco.
As mentioned above, the mandate is per each worker in the firm, thus while most firms offered insurance to some employees, initial eligibility and take up rates are also important for measuring how binding the policy was for affected firms. In San Francisco firms that offered insurance, about 87% of workers were eligible for benefits (82% in comparison firms, difference not significant after controlling for firm characteristics). Due to other forms of coverage or coverage refusal, 88% of eligible employees in San Francisco took up coverage (82% in comparison firms). This resulted in coverage for 77% of employees in San Francisco firms that offered health benefits (69% in comparison firms outside the city). On average, San Francisco firms required a minimum of 29.6 hours per week of work to qualify for benefits in 2007. Under the first year of implementation of the Health Care Security Ordinance, any employee who worked 10 hours per week or more on average needed to be paid health benefits. In 2009, workers who worked less than 8 hours a week on average were exempt.
Baseline Offering and Spending Gaps Relative to Mandate
Many plans offered in San Francisco at baseline did not meet the minimum health spending requirements of the mandate. The mean baseline monthly employer contribution for the most popular plan a company offered a single employee was $313 for San Francisco firms and $290 for comparison firms. In 2008, the average premium in the U.S. was $392/month or $4,704/year for single coverage (including employer and employee contributions, Claxton et al. 2008) . The most popular plan across San Francisco firms with 20-99 employees had a mean hourly contribution of $1.65 (based on a 172 hour work month). About 25 percent of surveyed firms in this group would not meet the 2007 minimum hourly benefit of $1.17. Across San Francisco employers with more than 100 employees, the mean hourly contribution to the most popular plan was $1.98. The required $1.76 falls at about the 47 th percentile. Outside San Francisco, the mean hourly contribution for the most popular plan was $1.69 and the median was $1.66. Figure 2 shows our three measures of compliance gaps for San Francisco firms at baseline before HCSO went into effect -based on eligibility, coverage, and enrollment-weighted payments for health benefits across all plans the firm offers. At baseline, about 56% of firms were in compliance with eligibility requirements, 33% were in compliance with coverage requirements, and 24% were in compliance with coverage and spending requirements. The mean gap in hourly spending requirements on a per worker basis was $0.49. This figure describes how much an employer needs to pay assuming that the employer keeps existing plans in place and there is no redistribution from more generous plans to less generous plans. The estimate of 24% in compliance relies on several assumptions. If we assumed that half of the workers hired in the last year were hired in the last 90 days, and all of those who were eligible for insurance in 2007 but did not take up benefits sign voluntary waivers, then the estimate would rise to 43%. Alternatively, baseline compliance would have been estimated as low as 18% if we assumed every employee needed to be covered under the health spending requirement (i.e., assuming no part-time or new employees and no waivers). Table 2 reports regressions of these three gap measures on various firm characteristics. We include indicators for two of the industries with the highest proportion of low-wage workers: restaurants and retail establishments. Restaurant and retail establishments make up 28% of our most impacted group of firms, and 68% of restaurants and 33% of retail establishments fall into this group. As Table  2 shows, firms with more low-wage, part-time (non-exempt) and temporary workers and smaller firms were significantly more likely to have gaps in eligibility, coverage, and generosity of benefits (as measured by the gap in per worker-hour spending at baseline). San Francisco restaurants were also more likely to have gaps in benefits, conditional on other covariates.
Gap in Percent of Employees Covered by Employer Health Benefits
Employer Reported Changes in Health Benefits in San Francisco after Mandate Implementation (2008)
San Francisco firms employed a variety of strategies to comply with the mandate (Figure 3 ). About 18% of firms paid into Healthy San Francisco, about one-third of which also reported some other benefit change as well. Many of the firms who made a change to their health benefits did so by adding a new health insurance offering (29%). The new health insurance offering might include a Health Reimbursement Account (14%), a new high deductible health plan (10%), or a mini-medical plan (10%). While significance is not shown in the figure, all of these changes are statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. A minimedical plan is a limited benefit plan with a very low maximum annual payout (often $10,000 or less). These plans often pay for a fixed number of physician visits, lab tests, or prescription drugs, but do not offer any insurance against catastrophic events (Fuhrmans 2006) . In San Francisco, some employers are setting up plans to just meet the health spending requirement. Figure 3 shows the overall proportion of San Francisco firms adopting each strategy, along with the proportions among the least impacted (those who were already in compliance at baseline according to our best point estimate), the most impacted (those with a spending gap of at least $0.50 per worker) and lowwage firms (those firms who have employees earning under $10 per hour). Those most heavily impacted by the HCSO were significantly more likely to create a new high deductible plan (7%), pay into an HRA (20%) or increase the employer insurance contribution (31%) than the least impacted firms. Low-wage firms were significantly more likely to add a new health insurance offering (57%) than other firms.
There has been a significant demand for the public option, with about onefifth of firms paying into Healthy San Francisco for at least some employees. Firms made use of the opportunity to pay into Healthy San Francisco to satisfy the mandate requirements. Of San Francisco firms in our sample, 18.3% responded that they were paying into Healthy San Francisco for their employees. The majority (92%) of those contributing to Healthy San Francisco paid into the program for only some of their employees, not all employees. This evidence suggests that employers were using the Healthy San Francisco public option for workers who are not eligible or taking up coverage at baseline. Only 8% of employers who contributed to Healthy San Francisco did so for all of their workers.
Due to concerns about sample size and possible bias in response, we use additional data from the city to confirm our estimates of how many firms were using the public option. According to the city's reports, as of October 2010 there were 54,680 enrollees in Healthy San Francisco; this compares to an estimated 79,000 uninsured adults in the city when Healthy San Francisco began, indicating Notes: 1. Employers are coded as contributing to Healthy San Francisco if they responded that they had contributed for some employees by the time they were surveyed in late 2008. For all other employer behaviors, employers are coded as adopting the response if they said that they had already implemented, definitely would implement, or were very likely to implement the change in the next year. 2. Low-wage firms include firms that have workers earning less than $10/hour. For the low-wage firms **, * indicates a significant difference between low-wage firms and the rest of the sample at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 3. The most impacted firms have a spending gap of at least $0.50 per worker-hour, while the least impacted firms have no spending gap. For the most impacted firms the **,* indicates a significant difference between the most and least impacted group at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. To further corroborate our estimates, we next compared the percentage of firms contributing to Healthy San Francisco in our 2008 Bay Area Employer Health Benefits Survey versus the percentage paying according to firms' reports to the city of San Francisco on the 2008 HCSO Annual Reporting Form (businesses are required to submit this report to the city each year to document how they have complied with the mandate). Of the 2,886 firms in our Dun and Bradstreet sample, we were able to use the business name to match 913 to the city's data. Of these 913 firms, 203 had responded to our survey and 709 had not. We find that the percentage of firms reporting to the city that they had contributed to Healthy San Francisco was five percentage points higher among firms not responding to our survey than among firms that did complete our survey (adjusted for firm size and industry). This difference is not statistically significant, suggesting again that our estimates appear robust to non-response biases. Looking across all firms submitting 2008 HCSO Annual Reporting Forms to the city, overall 20.5% of firms reported to the city that they contributed to Healthy San Francisco for at least some employees in the fourth quarter of 2008, which is remarkably close to the 18% estimate in Figure 3 To more systematically analyze the determinants of the pay-or-play decision, we estimate a probit model of whether the firm contributes to Healthy San Francisco using a set of firm characteristics. As shown in Table 3 , firms with low wage workers and firms with more temporary workers were more likely to contribute to Healthy San Francisco. Perhaps surprisingly, conditional on other characteristics, smaller firms (firms with 20-50 and 50-100 employees) were less likely to use the public option to meet the mandate. We extend two possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, the odds of a firm deciding to put at least one worker on Health San Francisco rises with firm size. Second, smaller firms were more likely to have to redesign their benefits package substantially; larger firms may have been close enough to their ex-post "optimal plan" that they put the remaining workers on the public plan. Notes: Regressions include for-profit San Francisco firms with ≥ 20 employees. Coefficient is marginal effect from probit regression. Weighted using employer sampling weights based on firm size, profit status, and industry. **,* indicates significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Results are weighted and adjusted for firm size, industry, and whether the firm is part of a chain. Difference is marginal effect from probit regression except in models with small samples (firms who don't offer insurance and low-wage firms). **,* Indicates significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively using heteroskedasticity-robust SEs. Firms are low-wage if they have workers earning <$10/hour. Most impacted group includes firms with a spending gap of ≥$0.50 per worker.
26
Forum for Health Economics & Policy, Vol. 14 [2011] Table 4 reports regression adjusted estimates of the effect of the Health Care Security Ordinance on new insurance offering among baseline non-offerors: firms in San Francisco were 33 percentage points more likely to report that they planned to begin offering insurance in 2008 compared to Bay Area firms not subject to the HCSO, a statistically significant difference. About half of nonoffering firms subject to the mandate reported that they were likely to begin offering insurance after the 2008 implementation of the mandate, as opposed to 8% of comparison firms (but the sample size is small, with only 42 non-offering firms). The difference among low-wage firms was even more dramatic, with lowwage San Francisco firms 51 percentage points more likely to begin offering insurance than their low-wage counterparts in the Bay Area. San Francisco firms were also significantly more likely than their Bay Area counterparts to begin offering a Health Reimbursement Account (HRA) after the mandate. Health Reimbursement Accounts are attractive to employers because a) employers can deposit the exact amount of the mandate for each worker into the account, b) the employer owns the account and can take back unused funds at the end of the year or upon termination of employment and c) employees who live outside San Francisco are not eligible for Healthy San Francisco, which makes HRAs more attractive from their perspective. After adjusting for firm characteristics, firms subject to the mandate were more likely to offer a new Health Reimbursement Account in 2008 (13% of San Francisco firms added a new HRA as opposed to 5% in Bay Area firms). In the group most impacted by the HCSO, 21% more firms in San Francisco planned to begin offering an HRA; restricted to low-wage firms only, the gap was 20%. San Francisco firms likely to offer an HRA were disproportionately in the restaurant industry, and were characterized by a greater proportion of female workers and a greater proportion of temporary workers (results not shown). Table 4 also presents analysis of reported reductions in health benefit generosity. Relative to comparison firms outside of San Francisco, a smaller portion of firms in San Francisco cut back employer sponsored health benefits during this time. To further investigate, we created a composite dichotomous measure called "reduced some health benefit" which takes on one if a firm either raised employee health insurance premiums by 25% or more, raised the deductible on a popular plan, dropped coverage, or restricted benefits. After adjusting for firm characteristics, fewer firms in San Francisco (11%) reduced at least one of these benefits than we predict would have absent the mandate (17%). Looking specifically at the components, there is also some evidence that the HCSO may be slowing the adoption of high deductible plans in San Francisco. After adjusting for firm characteristics, a slightly smaller portion of San Francisco firms (11%) added a new high deductible health plan (which tend to have lower monthly premiums) than otherwise would have occurred (16%), though the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Also, a smaller proportion (3% vs. 9%) increased the deductible of a popular plan to over $1,100 for singles in order to make it Health Savings Account qualified. There was no difference in the proportion of firms increasing the employee portion of health insurance premiums.
Comparison of Changes in Health Benefits with Neighboring Counties
There is little evidence of crowd-out due to the introduction of improved safety net coverage and the "public option." The unadjusted portion of firms dropping insurance in San Francisco (0.5%) is slightly lower than in the control group (2%, not shown). After adjustment for firm characteristics, the portion predicted in San Francisco with the treatment was not any higher than in surrounding counties (Table 4 ). The unadjusted proportion of firms restricting benefits in 2008 was also not any higher in San Francisco (1.3% in San Francisco versus 2.0% in Bay Area firms). After regression adjustment, the difference was not significant. Finally, although not reported in the table, less than 5% of firms who were offering coverage in 2007 and are now paying into the city option for some of their workers indicated that they have already dropped, or are considering dropping private employer health insurance plans.
Employer Attitudes Towards the Mandate
Most employers reported supporting the mandate, even among the highly impacted firms. After six months to a year into implementation, only 15% of firms subject to the mandate were unaware of the regulation (Figure 4) . Most of those who were unaware of the Ordinance already offered health benefits to workers (80%, not shown in figure) . This high awareness is likely in part due to the City's aggressive employer outreach efforts, which include mailing out notices to employers, distributing brochures in six languages, doing merchant walks, airing radio public service announcements, running bus shelter and print advertisements, and making presentations to employer and employee associations.
In terms of employer expectations regarding the mandate, 39% of San Francisco employers felt it was very likely that the health spending requirement would still be in place in one year, while about 9% felt it was not likely. At the time of the survey there was still considerable uncertainty about the outcome of the legal challenges to the employer mandate, thus some employers may have refrained from planning major benefit changes in response to the mandate in this first year. Since the Healthy San Francisco public option may have been the simplest alternative for many employers, this uncertainty may have raised the use of the public option over what it might have been otherwise. But the uncertainty may also have restrained other employers from dropping insurance coverage in favor of the public plan. Longer-term follow-ups will be needed to better understand these competing effects of the uncertainty.
Figure 4: Employer Sentiment Regarding Health Care Security Ordinance
Most employers said it was not difficult to comply with the mandate, while 19% thought it was very difficult to comply and 24% found compliance somewhat difficult, for a total of 43% reporting some difficulty with compliance. Among San Francisco restaurants surveyed, about 85% found it difficult to comply with the HCSO and 66% of those who were most impacted found it difficult to comply. We also estimated a probit model of predictors of compliance difficulty using the same vector of firm characteristics as before. Restaurants, retail establishments, firms with a greater proportion of female workers, and those with more part-time workers found it more difficult to comply with the mandate. Firms with a greater proportion of workers over age 65, and smaller firms found it less difficult to comply (Table 5 ). These findings mostly accord with expectations, except for the results related to firm size. Despite the large percentage of firms who needed to make changes to become compliant, the majority of firms (61%) were very or somewhat supportive of the mandate. Surprisingly, the proportion that was supportive was actually somewhat higher among low-wage firms (77%). Although not reported in the figure, the level of support was similar among restaurants (61%), one of the groups whose industry association was most vocally against the HCSO. The proportion of firms in support was also greater among firms that are most impacted by the HCSO (54%) than those that were the least impacted (39%), while it was only slightly lower (52%) in the small subset of firms that did not offer health insurance in 2007 at all. Overall, the evidence does not indicate that the relatively high degree of support for the Ordinance is driven by firms that were largely in compliance already (i.e., firms who might benefit if competitors' costs rose due to the Ordinance).
Table 5 also reports the firm-level predictors of support for the Ordinance based on a probit regression. Retail establishments, multi-establishment chains, and firms with a greater proportion of workers paid $10-$12 per hour were more likely to be supportive of the Ordinance, while those with a greater proportion of temporary workers were less likely to be supportive. The greater support among retailers, conditional on other characteristics, is particularly noteworthy given the relative difficulty they report in compliance. The relatively lower support among higher wage firms (the omitted category) is also contrary to expectations.
Discussion
San Francisco firms subject to a mandated health spending requirement have altered their behavior in 2008 compared to Bay Area comparison firms not subject to mandated spending. In the early stages of implementation, about one-fifth of employers responded to the spending requirement by paying into the Healthy San Francisco public option for some employees. While comparison firms outside San Francisco increased employee contributions and switched to high deductible health plans, San Francisco firms subject to the mandate added new health insurance options. There is little evidence after one year of crowd-out due to the mandate, such as stopping offering insurance or restricting the generosity of benefits for some workers. There is some evidence that San Francisco firms are more likely to increase HRA offerings in response to the mandate.
It is still early to draw firm conclusions about how employers absorbed the added costs of the health spending requirement. Economic theory predicts that there may be impacts on employment, wages, prices, or other compensation benefits; but which if any of these is realized depends on the nature of the labor market. Any disemployment effect would most likely be felt by workers earning at or near the minimum wage (currently $9.79 in San Francisco). In our sample, around 3% of workers in firms with more than 19 employees earned less than 10 dollars an hour. One of the industries most impacted by the HCSO is the "Eating and Drinking Places" SIC group, which may be why they reported it was difficult to comply with the law. Within this group, our sample shows that 25% of workers earn under 10 dollars an hour, and 68% of establishments are in our most impacted group, with a gap in health benefit spending per worker of at least 50 cents per hour. Using the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages to study the labor market effects of the Health Care Security Ordinance, a complementary paper uses Bay Area counties and the 24 largest metropolitan statistical areas in the United States as controls and does not find evidence indicating substantial job losses or real earnings reductions from the employer spending requirement during the first few years the mandate was in place. This was true for the private sector overall as well as for highly impacted sectors such as restaurants, food and accommodation establishments, and retail establishments. Restaurants seemed to have passed some of the cost of the mandate on to consumers through HCSOspecific surcharges (Colla, Dow and Dube 2010) .
Employer behavioral responses may also depend on uncertainty about future expected enforcement patterns. To the extent that there was uncertainty about whether the Ordinance would be overturned in court, or beliefs that there would be lax enforcement or only small penalties for violations, employer responses in this initial period may have been muted. Furthermore, if employers were to learn that enforcement was less stringent than expected, then they might be less likely to carry through on the expected behavioral changes reported in Table 4 and Figure 3 . This type of uncertainty is of course likely to accompany implementation of any similar employer mandates adopted elsewhere. In interpreting our results, it is important to bear in mind the legal uncertainty discussed above (9% of firms reported it unlikely that the Ordinance would still be in place in one year). Regarding enforcement, the city of San Francisco worked aggressively to educate employers about the HCSO employer mandate (reflected in the fact that 85% of employers surveyed were aware of it), but did not proactively audit for noncompliance. Enforcement activity has been primarily in response to employee complaints, and has consisted mainly of further employer education and assistance rather than large fines. As of June 2010, the Office of Labor Standards Enforcement (OLSE) had opened 330 compliance cases and assessed penalties of only about $20,000 (San Francisco Department of Public Health and the Office of Labor Standards Enforcement 2010). At the time of our survey, however, firms were unlikely to be aware yet of this enforcement pattern, providing one more reason for continuing to assess changing firm behavior over time.
How relevant are these findings to the national context in terms of a payor-play employer mandate as part of the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act? Given the limited evidence available from other settings it is important to study San Francisco's experience carefully. In doing so, we must bear in mind a number of features of the San Francisco setting which are unique and could limit generalizability, such as geographic and political characteristics of San Francisco, and specific parameters of the employer health spending mandate. First, San Francisco has the unique trait of being a city and a county giving it broader municipal powers than many other municipalities. Second, the residents of San Francisco are disproportionately high-income (median household income in 2008 was $73,798) and well-educated (81% high school, 45% bachelor degree or higher (City Data website; DeLeon 2002). Third, San Francisco is a peninsula, which increases the segmentation of its product markets -although this makes it if anything more relevant for understanding the impact of a national-level policy change. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that San Francisco's HCSO is on a per worker-hour basis, thus more firms may have had to expand health spending than if the health spending requirement were as a percentage of payroll or if more workers were exempt due to part-time hours. Similarly, the broad coverage of the mandate to include many temporary and part-time workers contributed to the fact that the majority of firms were required to expand spending in response to the mandate in San Francisco. Most firms in San Francisco will have to make a change to their health benefit policies due to the Health Care Security Ordinance, particularly in the eligibility of classes of workers such as temporary or part-time workers.
Employer behavioral responses to any pay-or-play mandate will also depend on the costs and perceived benefits of the "pay" option, in this case the Healthy San Francisco public option. Healthy San Francisco is in many ways a repackaging of the relatively generous set of safety net health services previously available in San Francisco, although that is changing as private providers such as Kaiser have now also become care delivery options for program enrollees. Safety net usage may also be perceived as more legitimized now that it has clear copayments and authorizations, as well as medical homes for enrollees. But the fact that access is limited only to San Francisco implies that Healthy San Francisco will necessarily be perceived as an inferior option for many employers and employees, thus crowd-out is likely to be lower here than if a true Medicarelike "public option" was introduced at a national level. Nevertheless it will be interesting to see if the use of Healthy San Francisco by employers rises or falls with time and development of the program.
Like Massachusetts and Hawaii, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act neither includes a public option for access to health benefits, nor would an HRA qualify as coverage. Therefore, some of the lower-cost and commitment choices that employers made in the early days of the San Francisco Ordinance will not be available to firms to comply with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Those San Francisco firms currently offering HRAs in order to comply with the San Francisco law will need to begin offering more traditional insurance plans, as HRAs won't qualify for the individual mandate. Finally, workers are unlikely to attribute the fine an employer pays for not providing health insurance as a benefit of employment the way they might in San Francisco (because they automatically receive discounted Healthy San Francisco program fees). This will likely make employers less likely to choose the "pay" option since they will be less able to pass it along to wages in the long run. In essence, qualifying health coverage under the "pay" option in federal reform will likely cost employers more on net than is the case in San Francisco.
On the other hand, some aspects of the national law will make it easier for firms to comply compared to the San Francisco ordinance. For example, the national law considers a worker exempt for part time status if they work less than 30 hours a week, which will allow many more employees to qualify as exempt from the law. In San Francisco, employers had to make contributions for workers who work at least 10 hours per week in 2008 (8 hours after 2009). Research from Hawaii suggests that under the federal reform firms may switch to using more exempt part-time workers (Buchmueller, DiNardo, Valletta 2009 ). In addition, existing group and individual insurance plans are "grandfathered in" as acceptable coverage under the federal plan. Thus the proportion of firms affected by the mandate may be lower than in San Francisco, since fewer firms will have to make changes in the generosity of benefits or cover part-time workers.
It is unclear how the San Francisco ordinance and Healthy San Francisco will interact with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. It is likely that Healthy San Francisco will not meet the requirements for qualifying health coverage (particularly since it is not technically "insurance" as currently structured) and so some of those currently enrolled in Healthy San Francisco will have to obtain more traditional insurance. The city has reported that 70% of Healthy San Francisco enrollees are under the poverty line, however, so many may be eligible for Medicaid (with a new income threshold of 133% of the poverty line for citizens) after the federal reforms. The situation is further complicated by the fact that there are many exemptions to the individual mandate -financial hardship, religious objections, American Indians, those without coverage for less than three months, undocumented immigrants, incarcerated individuals, those for whom the lowest cost plan option exceeds 8% of an individual's income, and those with incomes below the tax filing threshold. These San Francisco residents will still need Healthy San Francisco, and it may be that other cities will create a plan like Healthy San Francisco to bridge the gap for residents who fall into these categories. For example, according to the Congressional Budget Office (2010), undocumented immigrants account for about one-third of the 23 million individuals who are expected to remain uninsured. Healthy San Francisco provides benefits regardless of immigration status and could continue to cover this population after 2014. Finally, the legal uncertainty around the individual mandate at the federal level makes Healthy San Francisco even more relevant going forward. The city recently created a working group that will assess how health care reform will affect Healthy San Francisco.
Lessons from the San Francisco mandates can help policymakers determine what to expect with implementation of a national-level benefit mandate. Although the setting and policy details are not identical, these results overall suggest that implementation of the national employer mandate in 2014 may indeed be feasible as envisioned. First, pay-or-play mandates of this size are feasible; employers in San Francisco have been able to absorb the extra cost of providing health benefits without significant negative effects on employment or earnings. Some firms in industries where most competitors are also subject to the mandate, such as restaurants, have passed costs of the mandate to consumers. Second, many employers may choose the lowest-cost option available for newly insured employees. In the San Francisco case, this has largely played out through use of HRAs, Healthy San Francisco, and mini-medical plans, which are designed to just meet the health spending requirement. Finally, despite most employers having to make changes in their benefit policies to comply with the mandate, most employers are supportive of the Health Care Security Ordinance. This may be because the pay-or-play mandate was bundled with Healthy San Francisco, offering firms a low-cost way to provide benefits to workers. Finally, the San Francisco policy is occurring in a single city. Multi-establishment firms with locations outside the city may respond differently when confronted with a mandate in one of many locations, as opposed to a national mandate. San Francisco also has one of the highest minimum wages in the country at $9.79 as of January 2009 (though the difference is less striking after adjusting for the high general cost of living). The higher overall labor costs may influence the effects of the mandate, although a priori it is not clear in which direction. On the one hand, the additional costs due to the mandate may represent a smaller increase in overall costs. They also represent a smaller fraction of compensation, making it somewhat easier to absorb through lower wage income. On the other hand, coming on the heels of other mandates (such as the high minimum wage and 2007 newly enacted paid sick days requirements) might make it more onerous for businesses than would be the case nationally. This paper presents early responses to the Health Care Security Ordinance (6-12 months into implementation), at a time when there was still a large amount of uncertainty surrounding the future of the law. As more data become available, it will be important to study the medium-term effects of the San Francisco HCSO on wages, employment, firm size (firms close to the 20 or 100 employee thresholds may decide to stay at 19 or 99 employees due to the discontinuity in mandated costs), and the number and composition of uninsured in San Francisco.
